egyptdict_p1_The_Cratylus_Essay_Sedley_Plato
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The selections of Plato's Cratylus below are sections in which Socretes discusses 'motion.'
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The paragraph that follows is from an essay titled: Plato's Cratylus, written by
~~~~ Professor David Sedley for the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy © 2006. ~


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Hermogenes: Now after the class of words you have explained, I should like to examine the correctness of the noble words that relate to virtue, such as wisdom, intelligence, justice, and all the others of that sort.

Socrates: You are stirring up a mighty tribe of words, my friend; however, since I have
put on the lion helmet, I must not play the coward, but must, it seems, examine wisdom, intelligence, thought, knowledge, [411b] and all the other noble words of which you speak.

Hermogenes: Certainly we must not stop until that is done.

Socrates: By the dog of Egypt, I believe I have a fine intuition which has just come to me,
that the very ancient men who invented names were quite like most of the present philo-
sophers who always get dizzy as they turn round and round in their search for the nature
of things, and then the things seem to them to turn round and round and be in motion. ~

[411c] They think the cause of this belief is not an affection within themselves, but that the nature of things really is such that nothing is at rest or stable, but everything is flowing and moving and always full of constant motion and generation. I say this because I thought of
it with reference to all these words we are now considering.

Hermogenes: How is that, Socrates?

Socrates: Perhaps you did not observe that the names we just mentioned [wisdom, intell-
igence, thought, knowledge, justice and virtue] are given under the assumption that the things named are moving and flowing and being generated. ~

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[412d] For those who think the universe * is in motion believe that the greater part of it is
of such a nature as to be a mere receptacle, and that there is some element which passes through all this, by means of which all created things are generated. And this element must be very rapid and very subtle; for it could not pass through all the universe unless it were very subtle, so that nothing could keep it out, and it must be very swift, so that all other things are relatively at rest. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

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| The sections below presents Socrates discussing the sense of the 'letter r' sound. |
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[426b] ... Socrates: Now I think my notions about the earliest names are quite outrageous and ridiculous. I will impart them to you, if you like; if you can find anything better, please try to impart it to me.

Hermogenes: I will do so. Go on, and do not be afraid.

[426c] Socrates: First, then, the letter rho seems to me to be an instrument expressing all motion. ... [426d] ... Well, the letter rho, as I was saying, appeared to be a fine instrument expressive of motion to the name-giver who wished to imitate rapidity, and he often applies it to motion. In the first place, in the words rhein (flow) and rhoê (current) he imitates their rapidity by this letter, [426e] then in tromos (trembling), thrauein (break), ereikein (rend), thruptein (crush), kermatizein (crumble), rhumbein (whirl), he expresses the action of them all chiefly by means of the letter rho; for he observed, I suppose, that the tongue is least at rest and most agitated in pronouncing this letter, and that is probably the reason why he employed it for these words.

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Q The following paragraph is from the essay titled: Plato's Cratylus, written by Q
Professor David Sedley for the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy © 2006.
~~~~~
~~~~Like any good craftsman, Socrates also maintains, the name-maker (or ‘lawmaker’,
as he also somewhat mysteriously calls this particular expert) must turn his mind's eye to
the appropriate Form, which he then embodies in the materials at his disposal, just as a carpenter making a shuttle or drill, having turned his mind's eye to the appropriate Form, then embodies it in the particular wood or metal at his disposal. In the case of name-mak-
ing, the appropriate material is not wood or metal, but vocal sound. Implicitly, just as the
same shuttle Form can be embodied in various woods and metals, so too the same name
Form can be embodied with equal success in the various sound systems that different
languages employ. In this way, it is made clear, the undeniable fact that the same thing is called by many different names around the world need not conflict with the naturalist thesis that names belong naturally to their objects: each of those names is the appropriate and natural way to represent its name-Form in the local sound system (389d-390a).
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Sections [389d - 390a] of the Cratylus below, discuss: 'making a name that fits its object.'
[A 'shuttle' is used to pass an attached thread back and forth in a loom to weave a fabric.]
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[389d] Socrates: For each kind of shuttle is, it appears, fitted by nature for its particular kind of weaving, and the like is true of other instruments.

Hermogenes: Yes.

Socrates: Then, my dear friend, must not the lawgiver also know how to embody in the sounds and syllables that name which is fitted by nature for each object? Must he not make and give all his names with his eye fixed upon the absolute or ideal name, if he is to be an authoritative giver of names? And if different lawgivers do not embody it in the same syllables, we must not forget this ideal name on that account; for different smiths do not embody the form in the same iron, [389e] though making the same instrument for the same purpose, but so long as they reproduce the same ideal, [390a] though it be in different iron, still the instrument is as it should be, whether it be made here or in foreign lands, is it not?

Hermogenes: Certainly.

Socrates: On this basis, then, you will judge the law-giver, whether he be here or in a foreign land, so long as he gives to each thing the proper form of the name, in whatsoever syllables, to be no worse lawgiver, whether here or anywhere else, will you not?

Hermogenes: Certainly.

... [390e] and ... not every one is an artisan of names, but only he who keeps in view the name which belongs by nature to each particular thing and is able to embody its form in
the letters and syllables.
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